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Population ageing has triggered concerns about the sustainability of public systems 
of education. The empirical evidence is still inconclusive, whereas some 
theoretical results present a somewhat optimistic view (Gradstein and Kaganovich, 
2004; Levy, 2005).  The present note re-examines the political economy of public 
education in an ageing society, using the classical median voter model. The 
normative analysis shows that elderly households introduce distortions that render 
political outcomes inefficient except in rare circumstances. It is then explained 
that the interplay among the political and financial consequences of ageing gives 
rise to a non-linear, and possibly non-monotonic (inverted-U shaped) relationship 
between spending per pupil and the share of childless households in the population. 
Income inequality is shown to play a crucial role of in the process, revealing that 
ageing has a stronger tendency towards underprovision in economies with high 
inequality. The implications for the empirical literature are discussed. 
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Population ageing is one of the most important demographic processes transforming the world
since the end of World War II. Part of a new demographic transition western countries experi-
enced after the post-war baby boom, ageing has triggered concerns about the sustainability of the
Welfare State, especially, social security programs and, more recently, public systems of education.
While much research e⁄ort has been devoted to the analysis of the former, contributions on the
consequences over educaction policy are still scarce. This is rather surprising, as ageing raises im-
portant questions about the prospects of political support for public education: On the political
side, a relative increase in the population of elderly households implies that a smaller share of
voters receive direct bene￿ts from education spending. In a democracy, one could expect ageing
naturally leading to weaker political support for education. Nevertheless, on the ￿nancial side,
a declining share of school-aged children lowers the tax-price of education spending (how much
a unit of spending per pupil costs to tax-payers), which, ceteris paribus, makes voters willing to
support higher levels of spending. The overall e⁄ect of population ageing over education spending
is thus ambiguous and requires careful study.
What answers has the literature o⁄ered up to now? An increasingly large body of empirical
evidence ￿ which includes, among others, Rubinfeld (1977), Miller (1996), Poterba (1997), Ladd
and Murray (2001), Evans et al. (2001), and, more recently, Baldson and Brunner (2004), Grob
and Wolter (2005) and Fletcher and Kenny (2008)￿has only provided mixed results and is thus
inconclusive.
The ￿ avour of the theoretical results on the issue is, instead, somewhat optimistic. From
a positive perpsective, Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004) present a model where ageing is the
consequence of increased longevity and has an overall positive impact on public education funding:
Young adults realise education spending has an impact on the economy￿ s future productivity and,
thereby, on the returns they will obtain from their savings at retirement. The prospects of a
1longer retirement period, then, make them prefer higher education funding. When the share of
physical capital in the production function is su¢ ciently high, that e⁄ect more than o⁄sets the
political impact of the larger share of elderly households a longer life-span implies. While this takes
place in a dynamic economy across time, the analysis reveals that such a situation is compatible
with the, apparently contradicting, cross-section negative relationship between the share of elderly
households in a constituency and spending per pupil.
Another important theoretical contribution with implications for the ageing literature is found
in Levy (2005). Levy analyses a state-of-the-art model of two-dimensional voting which enables
her to study the political economy of public education when the government also provides (and
households vote for) direct income redistribution. In that model, it is only when young households
are a minority that the state provides educational services. In that case, the poor young are able
to commit to policies that are less bene￿cial to them than the old poor can. Thereby they manage
to form a winning coalition with the rich. In that coalition, the poor young give up full income
redistribution in order to get some public education. The rich, in turn, accept positive educational
transfers to avoid full income redistribution, which is aimed for by the largest minority ￿ the old
poor. If ageing entails that households with children become a minority then it would enhance
public spending on education.1
The present note contributes to the literature by studying the political economy of public ed-
ucation in an ageing society, using the classical median voter model. I therefore give up the study
of dynamics for a richer static framework2 : In Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004), working adults
1 From a normative perspective, Boldrin and Montes (2005) use an overlapping generations model to show
that a simple intergenerational transfer system involving public education and pensions can restore e¢ ciency
when there are borrowing constraints to ￿nance education. In their proposal, children borrow from the previous
generation to ￿nance their education, and pay the capitalised value of such debt back, once adults, in the form of
reteriment pensions. Nevertheless, generations in Boldrin and Montes￿contribution have a constant and identical
size, and thus the model does not yield any conclusions about the e⁄ects of ageing on the system. An interesting
theoretical exercise involves analysing their proposal in an ageing context to see how robust it is to such demographic
phenomenon.
2 The model is however able to capture particular dynamic aspects of the problem. Spending in education is
bene￿cial for a young household because it is an investment that increases the future income of their children. Also,
the demographic composition of the economy in my model can be derived from the dynamic demographic model
used, for example, in Gradstein and Kaganovich (2003). Here, each share of the elderly can be seen as the result
of a given value of their longevity parameter.
2from the same cohort are identical, making the analysis silent about the role of contemporaneous
inequality. Moreover, the ratio of children to tax-payers is constant, which leaves out an impor-
tant aspect of the problem: the decreasing tax-price of education spending as the population of
children shrinks. Likewise, I simplify the policy problem to one dimension in order to focus on the
implications of the median voter framerwork. Which model best matches the data is of course an
empirical question. In this respect, an advantage of the median voter framework is that it yields
more speci￿c predictions: the implemented policy is always that preferred by the median voter,
while in Levy￿ s model we only know it belongs to the Pareto-set of the members of the winning
coalition. It therefore has no say about demographic changes that do not induce a change in the
winning coalition.3
The analysis ￿rst reveals that elderly households introduce distortions that render political
outcomes ine¢ cient except in rare circumstances. Then, it is shown that the interplay among the
political and ￿nancial consequences of ageing gives rise to a non-linear, and possibly non-monotonic
(inverted-U shaped) relationship between spending per pupil and the share of childless households
in the population. Finally, the crucial role of income inequality in the process is unconvered: the
political e⁄ect is reinforced in economies with high inequality which thus have a stronger tendency
towards underprovision. The last two results have direct implications for the empirical literature,
which is discussed at the end of the paper.
The remaining of the article is organised in ￿ve sections. The next one introduces the model.
Section 3 studies the e¢ ciency properties of democratic outcomes. Section 4 is devoted to a
positive study of the impact of ageing on spending per pupil. The focus then moves towards
income inequality in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 closes the paper by o⁄ering some concluding
remarks and explaining promising directions for future research.
3 Of course, predictions from her model are richer in other respects, as they involve consumption of public and
private education and redistribution policy.
32 The model
Households and population ageing
A country, region or state is populated by a continuum of households with mass normalised to
1.4 Households exogenously di⁄er along two dimensions: income (which can also be interpreted
as parental human capital) and the number of children at school age: a proportion ￿ 2 [0;1]
of households are childless (or have children that are adults) and the rest have ￿ = 1 children
each.5 That implies a ratio of children to the population of households (tax-payers) equal to
1￿￿. Household types are indexed with i; subscripts 0 and 1 denote households with zero and one
children respectively. Ageing is the result of a rising life expectancy (or longevity), which raises
the share of the elderly in the population, and thereby reduces the ratio of children to tax-payers.6
The ageing process is speci￿ed as an exogenous increase in the share of childless households ￿.7
In what follows, I restrict attention to cases where households with children form a majority and
control the political arena (i.e. where ￿ < 0:5).




, and varies in the population according to the cummulative
distribution functions ￿1 (y) 2 [0;1] and ￿0 (y) 2 [0;1]. These are continuous, strictly positive on
all their support and have densities ￿1 (y) = ￿0
1 (y) and ￿0 (y) = ￿0
0 (y). The aggregate distribution
function can thus be written as:
￿(y) = ￿￿0 (y) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿1 (y)
4 The argument is thus developed in a single-jurisdiction setting where the population cannot move to other
jurisdictions. Interesting aspects of the problem emerge in multi-jurisdictional settings where households not only
vote but also compete with each other for where -which school district- to live in. The decentralised case with
mobility is certainly worth studying, but that exercise is left for future work.
5 I set ￿ = 1 to facilitate the exposition. As we shall see later on, the consequences of changing ￿ are straight-
forward to analyse.
6 Ageing may also be the result of a decreasing fertility rate, which directly reduces the ratio of school-aged
children to tax-payers.
7 Note that such change can be motivated as the result of an increase in average (or expected) longevity. See,
for example, Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004).




y (￿￿0 (y) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿1 (y))dy (1)
Preferences
To facilitate welfare analysis, and following de Bartolome and Ross (2004), I choose a quasi-
linear, money-metric utility function to represent households￿preferences. Utility of young house-
holds depends on current numeraire consumption, x, and on the future income (human capital)
of the o⁄spring, y0. As they do not have children to educate, the utility of old households simply
depends on current consumption:
u(x;e) = x + ￿cy0 = x + ￿ch(e;y) (2)
where ￿c 2 f0;1g indicates whether a household has a school-aged child (￿c = 1) or not. In
equation (2), o⁄spring future human capital (income) is a function of two inputs: school quality, e,
and home inputs, as measured by household parental human capital: h(e;y). The human capital
production function is monotonically increasing in the both of its arguments and strictly concave;
moreover, to ensure normality of demand for education, home and school inputs are assumed
complements: i.e. hey > 0.8
Two points are worth noting. Firstly, the above speci￿cation of preferences implies that child-
less households align themselves with poor ones with children when voting over education policies.
The hypothesis that the elderly, or more generally childless households, would vote following such
narrow, self-centered motivations may seem a radical one. However, whilst it simpli￿es the analy-
sis, this assumption does not alter the results. In particular, qualitative results also hold in a
setting where old voters bene￿t from education relatively less than young ones, as the evidence
suggests.9 Secondly, the choice of a money-metric utility function has the advantage that it com-
8 Subscriptis indicate derivatives.
9 The empirical evidence in Rubinfeld (1977), Baldson and Brunner (2004) shows that the strength of preferences
for education decline with age; that o⁄ered by Fletcher and Kenny (2008) lends speci￿c support to a view of the
political process where childless households ally with the poor. The theoretical model proposed by Levy (2005)
adopts the same assumptiom.
5pletely separates e¢ ciency and equity considerations: because marginal utility of consumption is
constant and equal to 1, aggregate welfare is invariant to the distribution of private consumption
in the population; precisely for the same reason, this utiltity function makes the distribution of
taxes across the population irrelevant for aggregate welfare.
School system and taxation
The state provides tuition-free public education to every child of school age. School quality
depends on spending per pupil and is produced with a technology that exhibits constant returns
to scale. Units of school quality are normalised so that each costs one unit of the numeraire.
I impose the following (political) restriction on school policy: The government is commited to
provide equal spending (and thus, in the current setting, quality) to all students.10
Education spending is ￿nanced by an economy-wide head tax. This provides a neater analysis,
as it avoids the distortions that childless households induce being intertwined with those stemming
from income taxation. Indirect utility is thus:
v(y;e;￿) = y ￿ ￿ + ￿ch(e;y) (3)
Voting
The representation of the democratic process considered in this paper is majority voting: Voters
choose among di⁄erent spending-taxation alternatives in pairwise contests. As the government is
required to balance its budget, a spending-taxation alternative is considered in the election if it is





Note ￿ = 1=(1 ￿ ￿)￿ is the inverted tax price of education spending (how much spending per pupil
the government can o⁄er per unit of tax). I assume voters understand the relationship between
10 This is probably the most common assumption in the literature (e.g. Epple and Romano, 1996; Martinez-Mora,
2006), though of course not the only one (e.g. De Fraja, 2002).
11 More precisely, the GBC should be written as e ￿ ￿￿. Nonetheless, it is immediate to prove that any alternative
satisfying the GBC with inequality will always be beaten in an election. Put it di⁄erently, only the alternatives
that satisfy the GBC with equality can be a political equilibrium of the model.
6taxation and spending per pupil established by the GBC, which makes voting unidimensional. A
voting equilibrium is a feasible alternative which constitutes a Condorcet winner, i.e. which is
preferred by at least half the electorate in pairwise contests against all other feasible spending-
taxation pairs.
3 Ageing and the ine¢ ciency of democratic outcomes
In this Section, I investigate the role of childless households and population ageing in the e¢ ciency
properties of centralised democratic outcomes.
Political equilibrium
When voting is unidimensional and households￿preferences over feasible spending-taxation
pairs are single-peaked, existence of a unique political equilibrium directly follows from the classical
median voter theorem (Black, 1948). Let us examine the single-peakedness of preferences in the
current setting: childless households do not have children to care about their future income, and
thus do not receive any bene￿ts from education spending. Their utility is thus monotonically
decreasing in the level of taxation and they prefer no taxes at all. Consider next households with
children: decreasing marginal returns to education spending imply their preferences are single-
peaked at the unique solution to their utility maximisation problem. Moreover, demand for public
education spending is increasing in income, due to the complementarity between home and school
inputs. Formally:
Lemma 1 (i) Preferences over feasible spending-taxation pairs are single peaked.
(ii) The most preferred spending-taxation pair of childless households is (0;0); that of house-
holds with children is strictly increasing in income.
Proof. The objective function of households with children in the voting problem is obtained
by plugging the budget constraint (4) into the indirect utility function (3). Its strict concavity
stems from the assumption of decreasing marginal returns to education spending. Of course,
strict concavity along with a linear budget constraint implies existence of a unique solution to the
optimisation problem, and that it is a global maximum. Childless voters, in turn, do not derive
7any bene￿t from education. Higher levels of spending per pupil, thus, only mean higher taxes
for them and lower utility. Therefore, their preferences for spending have a single peak at zero.
Finally, di⁄erentiating the FOC:
he(e;y) = 1 ￿ ￿ (5)






Noting that hey > 0 completes the proof of the second part.
Therefore, the median voter￿ s most preferred spending-taxation pair is the unique equilibrium
of the political process. That equilibrium is at the level of spending that equates her marginal
rate of substitution between school quality and private consumption. That is to say, denoting the
equilibrium spending level as e e, it is de￿ned as:
e e(e y;￿) = e such that he(e; e y) = 1 ￿ ￿ (6)
where e y denotes median voter￿ s income.
Next, lemma 2 provides the de￿nition of the income of decisive voters.12
Lemma 2 The median voter￿ s level of income, denoted e y, is implicitly de￿ned as13 :




Proof. The median voter is located at the median of the preference distribution across the whole
population. Lemma 1 showed two things: (i) that all childless households have a strict preference
for zero spending over any other alternative, and (ii) that the most preferred level of spending
is increasing in income for households with children. These two results imply that the median
12 Recall I restricted attention to cases where households with children form a majotity and dominate the
elections. That is, cases where the median voter has children (and thus ￿ < 0:5).
13 The explicit de￿nition is thus:









1 is the inverse of the cumulative income distribution function.
8voter￿ s level of income is such that the mass of households with children whose income is weakly
higher than e y represents 50% of the total population. Equation (8) can be rewritten as:
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿1(e y)) =
1
2
the LHS of this equation is the product of the share of households with children and the proportion
of them with income weakly above e y; hence, it is the share over the total population of young
households with weakly higher income than e y.
This is a natural result: the median voter is located at the median of the preference distribution
across the whole population. Given that public education is a normal good and that childless
households prefer zero spending, median voter￿ s income is such that the mass of households with
children that are richer represent 50% of the total population. That is equivalent to a share 1
2(1￿￿)
of the population of households with children. Clearly, the median voter·s income is at the median
of the income distribution of households with children if, and only if, ￿ = 0; and it is strictly below
it for any ￿ > 0.
The political equilibrium is thus reached in a situation where a coalition, with mass a half,
formed by poor households with children and childless ones, and which prefers lower spending,
opposes another coalition of voters, again with mass a half, made up by middle and high income
households with children, and whose members prefer higher levels of funding per pupil. The result
is similar to Epple and Romano·s (1996) ends against the middle property of political equilibria.
In their paper, that property holds in an election over education policy in a context with private
schooling. There, the poor ￿ who vote for lower spending (and taxation) because of a higher
marginal utility of private consumption￿and the rich ￿ who opt out of the public sector and thus
do not bene￿t from government spending in education￿ally themselves against the middle class
that push for higher taxes and spending.14
14 The income of decisive voters in an ageing economy could be further reduced by the presence of private
schooling, as households opting out of the public system would shift their vote to the lower spending coalition.
This would surely occur if it is the rich that opt for private schooling, but could not be the case if households in
the private sector do not belong to the top tail of the income distribution (as in Martinez-Mora, 2006). On the
9E¢ cient policy
E¢ ciency is de￿ned against a utilitarian Social Welfare Function (SWF): the unweighted sum
of household utilitities in society. In the current setting, this is exactly the same thing as max-
imising the net-of-costs aggregate bene￿t of education policy.15 Hence, the objective function




h(e;y)￿(y)dy ￿ e(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (9)
which yields the following FOC:
y Z
y
he (e;y)￿(y)dy = 1 (10)
As usual, the FOC establishes that the average marginal rate of substitution between school
quality and the numeraire across bene￿ciaries (households with children) must equal the marginal
rate of transformation between those same goods, equal to one. This is a Samuelsonian condition
for the e¢ cient provision of a public good (or a publicly provided service), which takes account of
the fact that only a subset of the population receives educational services. Of course, the e¢ cient
education policy does not depend on the share of childless households in the economy.
Let MRSa(e) be the average marginal rate of substitution across households with children at




policy pair ￿ i.e. the one preferred by the median voter:
Proposition 1 (i) The political equilibrium is ine¢ cient, unless the ratio of the average MRS







(ii) Overprovision (underprovision) results whenever the average marginal rate of substitution
at the equilibrium level of spending, MRSa(e e￿), is smaller (greater) than one.
Proof. Divide (10) by (5).
other hand, as in the present framework, the tax price falls as households substitute public schools for private ones.
Hence, the overall impact is again unclear. See Epple and Romano (1996), Nechyba (1999).
15 To see why, note that with a quasi-linear utility function social welfare is invariant to the way taxation is
distributed across the population.
10Comparison of the e¢ cient outcome to the political equilibrium reveals two sources of ine¢ -
ciency of opposite sign: (i) The median voter￿ s valuation of education spending will usually not
coincide with the mean valuation of the bene￿ciaries. (ii) The tax price is below the production
cost whenever the share of childless households in the population is positive. The former ine¢ -
ciency source, which arises even with ￿ = 0, was already pointed out by Stiglitz (1974). As far
as I am aware, the latter ine¢ ciency has not been previously identi￿ed formally. It is however
inherent to any situation where the government uses universal taxation to fund a service not every
tax payer receives ￿indeed the case of most public services. Such ine¢ ciency arises regardless of
the tax instrument in use, even if the government uses a non-distortionary head tax. To conclude,
it is important to remark that the tax-price ine¢ ciency, as well as the divergence between median
and median voter￿ s income, widen with ageing.
4 The non-linear e⁄ect of ageing on spending
Demographic ageing alters the political equilibrium through two di⁄erent mechanisms: a ￿nancial
tax-price e⁄ect and a political median voter e⁄ect. The former ￿ which corresponds to the RHS of
equation (11)￿swings the political equilibrium towards overprovision, for the tax price of a unit of
school spending per pupil goes down when the proportion of children decreases. The latter e⁄ect
￿ LHS of equation (11)￿creates a tendency towards underprovision, as the income of decisive voters
falls with population ageing.16 17 To shed light into the likely direction of those ine¢ ciencies (i.e.
into which e⁄ect dominates at di⁄erent levels of ￿), and into the way population ageing a⁄ects
education policy and social welfare, in this Section, I study the consequences of an increase in the
16 As a matter of fact, ageing could reverse the political situation and make childless households decisive. In the
current setting, such situation would simply cause the collapse of the public education system.
17 The political impact of ageing occurs because some households stop being direct bene￿ciaries of education
spending; the ￿nancial aspect is related to a decrease in the ratio of children to tax payers (or more generally, to
the tax base). If ageing did not alter the share of households with no children (e.g. because it simply consists of a
reduction in the number of children per household and not in that of households having children), only the ￿nancial
side of the problem would be relevant. In that case, ageing would clearly have a positive impact on spending per
pupil. Likewise, if the ageing process only meant an increase in the share of households with no children, then a
decrease in spending per pupil would unambiguously result, as only the political median voter e⁄ect would be at
work.
11mass of households with no children at school-age.












The ￿rst term in the RHS of the equation catptures the political side of the problem. Speci￿cally,
by putting more households at the bottom of the policy-preference distribution, ageing reduces the
income of the median voter, thus resulting in weaker support for public spending. The second term
refers to the ￿nancial side of the question: a marginal increase in the share of childless households
(or, more generally, a decrease in the ratio of children to tax-payers) implies a reduction in the
tax price that, ceteris paribus, will yield higher spending per pupil. Let us ￿rst analyse the e⁄ect
of ageing on the income of the decisive voters; the next lemma shows that it is non-linear:









￿c (e y (￿))
< 0 (13)
(ii) That reduction occurs at an increasing (decreasing) rate for any income distribution, or





4(1 ￿ ￿)￿c (e y)
2 > (<)0 (14)
Proof. Recall e y is de￿ned by (8). Use the implicit function theorem to obtain the ￿rst derivative
of median voter income with respect to the share of childless households in the population. Then















Clearly, this derivative is negative whenever ￿
0
c (e y) ￿ 0, that is to say with a uniform or monoton-
ically increasing income distribution function, or, in general, whenever the term in square brakets
is positive.
Population ageing depresses the income of decisive voters. After a marginal increase in ￿, it
falls by an amount equal to the increase in the proportion of households with children that form
the higher spending coalition, 1
2(1￿￿)2, divided by the density of households with children at the
12decisive voter￿ s income, ￿c (e y). As equation (13) reveals, the median voter e⁄ect is non-linear
and it usually intensi￿es as the ageing process advances. To see why, note the ￿rst term in the
RHS of equation (13) increases with ￿ at an increasing rate. That is the natural consequence of
a shrinking population of households with children (see Figure 1). That e⁄ect is moderated by
the density of households with children at the median voter￿ s income: it is ampli￿ed where that
density is smaller but it might even be reversed within ranges of the income distribution where
the probability density function is decreasing and su¢ ciently steep.
With a uniform distribution, the term in square brackets in equation (15) equals 1 so that the
median voter e⁄ect always intensi￿es with ￿. Clearly, this is also true for monotonically increasing
income distributions. Regarding non-monotonic ones, the median voter e⁄ect strengthens with
￿ at ranges where the income distribution is increasing, and even at some intervals where it is
decreasing but not steep enough. Figure 2 shows the relationship among the share of childless
households and median voter income for three lognormal distribution functions, with di⁄erent
degrees of inequality. In all these examples the median voter e⁄ect intensi￿es at higher levels of
￿.18
Proposition 2 (i) Ageing has a non-linear, and possibly non-monotonic, relationship with the
level of spending per pupil:
de e￿ (e y (￿);￿)
d￿
=





(ii) Spending per pupil increases (falls) with ageing whenever:




Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem to the FOC:
he (e￿(y;￿);y) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) = 0 (18)
18 Along the formal analysis, I will be using three computational examples to illustrate the results. Income
distributions are lognormal with identical mean (of the associated normal distribution) parameter: ￿ = 3:5 ,
and spread parameter ￿A = 0:3, ￿B = 0:7 and ￿C = 1:1. I set a minimum level of income di⁄erent from zero
(ymin = 5). The implied median income is equal to ymed = 38:12, and the means are, respectively, yA
mean = 39:64,
yB
mean = 47:31, and yC
mean = 65:64. These yield standard deviations of 10:63, 33:64, and 93:03, and mean to
median income ratios of 1:04, 1:24 and 1:72, respectively. See footnote 20 for further details.
13it is straightforward to obtain de￿=dy and de￿=d￿ and rewrite (12) as (16) which is also non-
linear. Non-monotonicity will characterise the relationship under study whenever ￿hey(e e￿; e y)
de y
d￿￿1
changes sign for some ￿ 2 (0;0:5). To prove (ii) note that given the strict concavity of the human
capital production function, the overall impact on the level of spending only depends on the sign
of the numerator of (16).
While the RHS of (17) is ￿xed at unity, the LHS depends on the income elasticity of education
demand and on the marginal impact of ￿ over the income of median voters.19 The larger that
elasticity the stronger the impact of the falling political support in the actual level of spending per
pupil. The previous results reveal that a rise in the proportion of childless households has a non-
linear and possibly non-monotonic impact over funding per pupil. Not only because two opposing
forces are at work, but also because the median voter e⁄ect is in general non-linear. Indeed,
the examples plot in Figures 2 and 3 con￿rm that the ageing process may increase spending per
pupil at the initial stages of the process, whilst leading to stark reductions as the process deepens,
something which implies an inverted U-shaped relationship among ￿ and e.
5 The role of income inequality
The next proposition shows that income inequality among households with children a⁄ects the
impact of ageing over public education. Restricting attention to uniform and lognormal income
distributions, it reveals that population ageing has more pernicious e⁄ects in more unequal democ-
racies.
Proposition 3 Consider two economies L and H (acronyms for low and high inequality) identical
except for the income distribution function of households with children, ￿L and ￿H.

















and the median voter￿ s income is lower in H than in L for all ￿ 2 (0;0:5]:
e yL (￿) > e yH (￿); 8￿ 2 (0;0:5]
19 In particular, under my speci￿cation of preferences, it depends on the degree of complementarity between
home and school inputs.
142. Let ￿L and ￿H be lognomal distribution functions such that the mean and standard deviation
parameters of the associated normal distributions satisfy: ￿L = ￿H and ￿L < ￿H. Then, the












and the median voter￿ s income is lower in H than in L for all ￿ 2 (0;0:5):
e yL (￿) > e yH (￿); 8￿ 2 (0;0:5]
Proof. 1. For a uniform distribution, inequality increases with the di⁄erence between the max-
imum and minimum level of income. Note also that the density ￿c (y) = 1
y￿y is constant over
the support and it decreases with the degree of income inequality. Hence, as it can be checked in
equation (13) de y=d￿ increases when y ￿ y does.
2. Note ￿rst that for ￿ 2 (0;0:5) the de￿nition of median voter income implies the relevant
range of the income distribution is precisely that below median income. A property of the lognor-
mal cumulative distribution function is invoked for this proof: Consider two lognormal distribution
functions ￿L and ￿H with ￿L = ￿H and with ￿L < ￿L. Then ￿L First Order Stochastically Dom-
inates ￿H for y below the median and viceversa. That is to say, in the relevant range:
￿L (y) < ￿H (y); 8y < ymedian



















e yL > e yH; 8￿ 2 (0;0:5)
In order to go back to an equilibrium situation after a marginal increase in ￿, some initially
decisive households with children must join the higher spending coalition. Hence, the income of
the median voter falls. Increased income inequality implies a lower density around the income
of the median voter with both uniform and lognormal distributions. Thereby, an (equally small)
15increase in the share of old households triggers a greater decrease in the income of decisive voters
(Figure 2) and in the level of spending per pupil (Figure 3).
Figure 3 plots equilibrium spending per pupil against the share of childless households.20
Several remarks are in place: (i) In examples A and B (with low and medium inequality), the
relationship among spending per pupil and the proportion of childless households is non-monotonic
and has an inverted-U shape. (ii) In these cases, the tax price e⁄ect dominates for low levels of ￿,
which makes spending per pupil to increase with ageing within a range (0;￿￿). (iii) This e⁄ect is
more intense and holds for a larger range of ￿, the less inequality there is. (iv) Further increases in
the proportion of elderly households, make the political median voter e⁄ect dominate and reduce
funding per student. Declines in spending are increasingly larger, and become stark once the
median voter is below the mode of the lognormal distribution. (iv) In example C, an economy
with high income inequality, the tax price e⁄ect never dominates. Instead, the waning political
support for public education funding makes spending per pupil fall with ageing at all stages of the
process.
Before ending this Section, it is worth calling the reader￿ s attention towards a caveat of the
analysis. The model above adopts the neutral assumption that population ageing does not change
￿1. But this of course needs not be the case in the real world. The ageing process might alter
the income distribution of households with children. It is therefore relevant to ask: what happens
if the income distribution of households reaching old ages is di⁄erent from the initial ￿1? To
investigate this issue, let now the income distribution depend on ￿: ￿1 (y;￿;￿;￿).
20 In these examples, I adopt a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas human capital production function; the
induced utility function is thus written as:
u(x;e) = x + ￿ch(e;y) = x + ￿ce￿y1￿￿ (19)
The median voter·s most preferred policy pair is then:









The income distributions are lognormal with parameters set at the levels used in the examples in ￿gure 2 (see
footnote ??). The technology parameter ￿, which accounts for the share of school inputs in the generation of future
income, is set at 0:06. This generates a level of spending which is roughly 5% of total income.
16Proposition 4 If a marginal increase in ￿ rises (reduces) the value of the cumulative income
distribution function of young households at the initial median voter income, i.e. if
@￿1(e y;￿;￿;￿)
@￿ >






Proof. Let the income distribution function depend on the share of childless households: ￿1 (y;￿;￿;￿).
Suppose the economy is in an equilibrium with ￿ = ￿0, and e y = e y (￿0). Derive the median voter













In other words, if more (less) households with income above the median voter￿ s become childless
in relative terms, then the median voter e⁄ect intensi￿es (weakens), strenghthening the tendency
of ageing towardsunderprovision (overprovision).
6 Discussion and ￿nal remarks
This paper uses the median voter model to take a new look at the impact of population ageing over
education policy in centralised democracies. The focus is on the interplay of two opposing forces:
the tax-price e⁄ect induced by a lower ratio of children to tax payers; and the median-voter e⁄ect
which reduces her income when the share of childless households increases. It is ￿rst explained
that childless households, and ageing, introduce distortions into democratic systems of education.
On the one hand, the marginal bene￿t derived from education spending by decisive voters rarely
coincides with the average marginal bene￿t. On the other hand, while the government funds
education spending through universal taxation, only a part of society receives its bene￿ts. In that
case, even with non-distortionary head taxes, the tax price voters face is downwards biased with
respect to production costs.
17From a positive perspective, the analysis reveals that population ageing has a non-linear and
possibly non-monotonic relationship with spending per pupil. Whether that demographic process
tends to increase or depress funding per student depends on the degree of income inequality. Lower
levels of inequality imply milder median-voter e⁄ects so that the tax-price e⁄ect, which creates a
tendency towards overprovision, dominates. In economies with high income inequality, in turn,
the median-voter e⁄ect of ageing is strong and easily dominates, which may lead the economy to
a situation of underprovision of public education. These theoretical results yield two hypotheses
to be tested empirically: the non-linear impact of the share of elderly households on spending, and
the moderating e⁄ect of income inequality. Levy (2005) reveals that predictions of the median
voter do not extend to elections on the level of redistribution and of education spending. Her
results hinge on whether the elderly are in a minority or in a majority in the population. In the
latter case, young households form part of the coalition in government and obtain more spending
per pupil. Moreover, an increase in income inequality may in that situation enhance spending per
pupil. Which model best matches the data should be subject to empirical scrutiny.
There are still other open questions on the issue, which make further theoretical e⁄orts nec-
essary. A particularly challenging problem is the analysis of the question in a multi-community
setting. Given the recent development in the political economy literature, it is also worth to
continue exploring richer models of the political process.
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